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n July 2, 2000, Vicente Fox became Mexico’s first democratically elected 
opposition  president.  Within  weeks,  President-elect  Fox  scheduled 
a trip to the United States, and on August 17 he made good on his 
campaign promise to reexamine U.S.–Mexican migration relations by proposing 
that the countries of North America lay the groundwork to remove controls on 
regional labor flows. The idea of a common market fell on deaf ears within 
the United States, but President George W. Bush agreed with Fox that Mexican 
immigrants make essential contributions to the U.S. economy and that the core 
U.S. migration policy problem was the shortage of legal mechanisms to match 
willing Mexican workers with U.S. employers. Migration was one of two issues 
at the top of the agenda (along with energy cooperation) when Bush made 
Mexico  his  symbolically  important  first  international  destination,  and  many 
observers were optimistic that the former border-state governor would move 
quickly to adopt a radical new approach to bilateral immigration issues. 
The presidents met three more times in the next three months, and opti-
mism about an immigration deal was reinforced at the fifth Bush–Fox summit, in 
Washington, D.C., on September 5, 2001. Following the summit, which included 
a first-ever full joint cabinet meeting, Bush and Fox announced a framework for 
additional cabinet-level negotiations aimed at a bilateral immigration deal. At the 
heart of the framework agreement were a U.S.–Mexican guest-worker arrange-
ment and the theme of “shared responsibility” for migration enforcement to pre-
serve orderly migration flows (White House 2001). With the U.S. Senate passing 
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to adjust to legal immigrant status, an immigration deal seemed imminent. 
The terrorist attacks of September 11 derailed this progress. Immigration nego-
tiations were suspended while the United States turned its attention to homeland 
security and the October 2001 invasion of Afghanistan. Then relations became 
strained when the United States expanded its “war on terrorism” to include Iraq, 
and Mexico refused to support the U.S. position in the United Nations Security 
Council. Mexicans grew impatient with President Bush’s failure to return to the 
negotiating table before the end of his first term. And after President Fox staked 
his personal prestige on an immigration deal, many analysts concluded that the 
countries’ failure to advance the bilateral migration agenda had undermined the 
Fox presidency (see Castañeda 2003; Sullivan and Jordan 2002).
Nonetheless, immigration remains at the top of the political agenda in both 
countries. The Mexican House and Senate—divided on many issues—unani-
mously approved a Concurrent Resolution in February 2006 endorsing a report 
by a top-level public–private working group, which reiterated the principles un-
derlying the earlier bilateral framework agreement (Hernández et al. 2005). In 
the United States, immigration dominated Washington’s attention through much 
of 2005 and 2006, but the House and Senate passed widely divergent bills during 
the 109th Congress, neither of which responded directly to Mexico’s concerns. 
Many analysts believe Republicans were punished at the polls in 2006 for their 
failure to pass meaningful migration reform, and Democrats returned to the issue 
during the 110th Congress, though reform efforts hit a road block in the Senate 
(see Wallsten and Gaouette 2006; Rosenblum 2008).
Thus, as 2007 draws to a close with a new Mexican president and the United 
States preparing for elections in 2008, familiar questions remain at the top of the 
regional relationship. Do the United States and Mexico share common interests 
in migration policy? Would the two countries benefit from a bilateral migration 
agreement? What shape might such an agreement take? It remains easy to identify 
potential areas of agreement: Both countries benefit from Mexican labor migra-
tion, both would benefit further if a higher proportion of cross-border flows 
occurred through legal channels, and both would benefit from bringing more 
order and security to the border. Yet substantial obstacles to a bilateral migration 
deal remain, including conflicting priorities about the details of a potential agree-
ment, political obstacles to bilateralism within each country, ambiguity about the 
broader strategic costs and benefits of a bilateral migration deal, and institutional 
design problems.
This chapter begins by briefly reviewing theoretical issues regarding oppor-
tunities for migration cooperation. Immigration is an inherently multidimensional 
issue and differs from trade and other aspects of the bilateral relationship because 
of Mexico’s unique ability to influence policy outcomes. Thus, simple asymmetric 
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making, and it is necessary instead to consider specific migration preferences in 
each country as well as the context in which migration negotiations occur. The 
remainder of the chapter therefore reviews the history of U.S. and Mexican pref-
erences over migration policy, changes in the broader bilateral relationship, and 
the evolution of bilateral conflict and cooperation on migration policy. A final 
section evaluates contemporary preferences and context to identify obstacles and 
opportunities for migration cooperation at this time. 
Immigration Cooperation: Theoretical Obstacles and  
Opportunities
In theory, U.S.–Mexican immigration regulation would appear to be a natural 
issue for bilateral cooperation. The traditional international relations literature 
on cooperation stresses the role of information asymmetries, weak institutions, 
and the costs of defection as barriers to cooperation. As in the classic prisoners’ 
dilemma game, international cooperation is limited by each country’s fear that the 
other will unilaterally defect, leaving the honest player with a high-cost “sucker 
payoff” (Axelrod 1985). Yet this analogy seems to apply poorly to immigration 
policymaking because the issue area is characterized by relative transparency: 
The United States can observe (at least roughly) whether Mexico is meeting com-
mitments to enforce its side of the border or assist in the recruitment of temporary 
workers, and Mexico can easily observe U.S. policies regulating visa issuance. 
Prisoners’ dilemma-like conditions are also ameliorated by the dense institutional 
structure surrounding bilateral issues between the United States and Mexico, by a 
broad set of shared norms, and by the long time horizons that neighbors sharing 
a 2,000-mile border are forced to adopt.
Migration policy also differs from other issues on the bilateral agenda be-
cause of the high degree of interdependence within the U.S.–Mexican migra-
tion system. U.S. efforts to regulate migration flows are inherently vulnerable 
to changing conditions within Mexico—for example, when changing Mexican 
economic conditions affect emigration pressures. And the migration relationship 
is structurally bound by a shared border and 500-year-old social and cultural net-
works, meaning that in contrast with other bilateral policy issues such as trade or 
investment, the United States has limited ability to opt out of bilateral migration 
relations by shifting its focus to other partners. As a result, migration relations are 
quintessentially characterized by complex interdependence (Keohane and Nye 
1977; Manning 1977), rather than by the asymmetric bargaining dynamics charac-
terizing other dimensions of the bilateral relationship.
In  addition  to  interdependence,  migration  relations  are  characterized  by   
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tive implications, sitting at the nexus of security, economic, and cultural policy, 
and potentially responsible for large-scale demographic changes. On the other 
hand, migration is also multidimensional in its policy implementation. Whereas 
rules governing international investment are mainly defined by restrictions on 
entry and exit, for example, migration regimes must define selection criteria and 
procedures for admission, the terms of entry (length of stay, rights and respon-
sibilities within the United States), a wide range of enforcement issues, rules for 
return migration, and immigrant integration policies, among other questions.
A final area of complexity derives from the multiple nongovernmental actors 
within each country who perceive a direct stake in the debate, also in contrast 
with most other aspects of international relations. Immigration policy is contested 
not only by business and labor groups, but also by social conservatives and anti-
population-growth groups, which oppose flows, and by human rights, religious, 
civil liberties, and ethnic interest groups, which support more generous poli-
cies. Thus, far from resembling a simple one- or two-dimensional coordination 
problem with a unique equilibrium point, migration negotiations are an extreme 
version of Krasner’s (1991) multiple-equilibrium model in which the challenge is 
choosing among the many possible pareto-improving regimes that exist. 
Similarly, traditional assumptions about unified states engaging in game theo-
retic negotiations are of limited utility in the case of U.S.–Mexican migration pol-
icy, suggesting a need for a more nuanced negotiation-analytic approach (Sebe-
nius 1983). In this case, international relations theory directs attention to specific 
state preferences and the preferences of competing actors within each state, to 
the role of domestic and transnational interest groups and epistemic communi-
ties, and to the strategic environment in which migration policymaking occurs 
(Lake and Powell 1999; Moravcsik 1997; Sebenius 1992). The following section 
thus examines how Mexican and U.S. migration preferences have been mediated 
by the broader context to produce unilateral and collaborative migration policy 
responses during the twentieth century. 
U.S.–Mexican Migration Policy: A Historical Perspective
What do Mexican and U.S. policymakers hope to accomplish through their 
migration policies? In general, state interests in migration policy reflect the rela-
tionship between migration and security, economic prosperity, foreign policy, and 
national identity. These broad concerns have produced shifting short-term policy 
demands in both countries, with the Bracero Program (1942–64) and the end of 
the Cold War in 1990 marking important turning points. While the two states have 
often had conflicting migration agendas, their goals during the contemporary 
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Mexican Preferences
In the Mexican case, the early part of the twentieth century was characterized 
by revolution and state consolidation, so migration preferences were necessarily 
laissez faire. Migration at this time followed traditional seasonal patterns—some 
of which predated the international border established in 1848—as industrial-
ization and infrastructure development in the U.S. Southwest outpaced Mexican 
development and as land ownership patterns in Mexico limited employment op-
tions at home. Mexicans benefited from these jobs, which already paid twelve 
times more than jobs in Mexico (Lessard 1984, 98–99). And the postrevolutionary 
Mexican state quickly came to depend on emigration as a development strategy 
and a political safety valve, a position enshrined in Article 11 of the 1917 Mexican 
constitution, which forbids exit restrictions (Craig 1971, 18; Cardoso 1979, 20). 
Nonetheless, this general economic preference for a free emigration regime 
was balanced by conflicting political and developmentalist ideas. First, Mexican 
thinkers had long expressed concern that the country was underpopulated and 
that both economic development and national security required investment in 
domestic manpower (Kirstein 1977). Labor-dependent state development goals 
were particularly embraced by the Lázaro Cárdenas (1934–40) and Manuel Cama-
cho administrations (1940–46). At the same time, emigration to the United States 
in particular raised additional concerns, both on a security level in the wake of 
three U.S. incursions into Mexico during the previous century, and in light of   
the long record of discrimination against Mexican workers in the United States 
and the more recent record of harsh repatriation campaigns during the Great   
Depression (Lessard 1984). For all these reasons, “the majority of literate Mexi-
cans were totally opposed to emigration” (Cardoso 1979, 20) at the start of World   
War II.
Regularization of flows during the Bracero guest-worker program radically 
altered migration politics within Mexico. On one hand, concerns about the mis-
treatment of Mexican workers intensified, and Mexican business, labor, and po-
litical leaders all resented the failure of U.S. officials to prevent undocumented 
migrant employment or to enforce other pro-labor Bracero provisions, especially 
in the program’s later years. On the other hand, peasants strongly supported the 
program, voting with their feet by overwhelming Bracero recruitment stations 
(Craig 1971). And bureaucrats administering the program quickly became an in-
fluential pressure group supporting its continuation because they benefited from 
the $20–$50 worth of bribes that the typical Bracero worker paid to obtain his 
visa (Craig 1971; Pfeiffer 1979).
Mexican economic dependence on emigration intensified in the postwar pe-
riod as development programs systematically kept rural wages down to subsidize 
state-led industrialization. Thus, Mexico lobbied successfully in 1961–63 to delay 
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the next decade pushing behind the scenes for a resumption of a formal bilateral 
visa program to ensure continued access to U.S. labor markets and to protect 
workers’ rights. By the mid-1970s, however, it became clear that the United States 
lacked the capacity or the will to enforce immigration restrictions, and Mexicans 
accepted the new informal regime, which offered the benefits of market-based 
emigration without the costs of a formal acknowledgment of Mexico’s failure to 
create jobs at home (Fitzgerald 2006; Rico 1992).
A final stage in the development of Mexican migration preferences began 
to take shape during the 1980s and ’90s as the threat of migration enforcement 
loomed larger. Unilateral U.S. enforcement efforts failed to substantially affect 
Mexican access to U.S. labor markets, but the criminalization of undocumented 
migration and harsh anti-immigrant rhetoric offended Mexican sensibilities. With 
80 percent of Mexicans having a personal connection to a current or former im-
migrant, the issue took on growing political importance in a newly democratic 
Mexico, and new emigrant rights groups (within Mexico and spanning Mexico 
and the United States) demanded government action (Fitzgerald 2006; Guarnizo, 
Portes, and Haller 2003). At the same time, the heavy U.S. focus on border en-
forcement had the perverse effect of increasing criminality and migrant deaths in 
the border region as migrants were more likely to rely on professional smugglers 
and as the U.S. “war on drugs” contributed to higher profits and more border 
violence. In this context, and learning from their successful effort to influence 
U.S. policy during the debate over the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), Mexican officials and others close to the government began an explicit 
effort during the 1990s to reframe migration as a regional problem demanding 
regional solutions rather than a domestic issue on which Mexico should defer to 
U.S. sovereignty (Rosenblum 2004a).1
More than a decade later, the combination of sustained attention to the hu-
man rights crisis at the border and within the United States, the strengthening of 
U.S.–Mexican economic integration, growing violence on the Mexican side of the 
border, and new concerns about the Mexican “brain drain” problem has contrib-
uted to a growing consensus within Mexico to abandon its historic “policy of no 
policy.” As summarized by a high-level working group including legislators, cur-
rent and former executive branch officials, academics, and representatives of non-
governmental organizations, the consensus centers around six principles: (1) the 
status quo regime has failed Mexicans and demands an active policy response; 
(2) that response should include collaboration between the United States and 
Mexico (“shared responsibility”); (3) emigration pressures will continue as long 
as Mexicans lack economic opportunities at home; (4) migration policy should 
protect the human rights of all migrants, regardless of their legal status; (5) border 
security, including antismuggling efforts, must be a top priority; and (6) Mexico 
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compelling Central American transmigration through Mexico (Hernández et al. 
2005). In a rare example of multipartisan consensus, these principles and related 
policy recommendations—development in sending communities, collaborative 
enforcement efforts, replacement of undocumented with legal migration, reinte-
gration programs for returning immigrants—were unanimously endorsed by both 
chambers of the Mexican Congress in February 2006. Broadly similar language 
appeared in the platforms of all three major parties during the 2006 presidential 
campaign.
U.S. Preferences
U.S. policymakers have typically viewed Mexican migration through an eco-
nomic lens—as a source of cheap labor, for better or worse—but security and 
diplomatic concerns have also influenced the debate, especially during periods 
of U.S. overseas conflict. Each of these views of migration, along with cultural 
and national identity concerns, has intensified in the post-Cold War and post-
9/11 period, raising the stakes of the debate for U.S. policymakers and the public 
(Rosenblum forthcoming). 
Historically, the overall U.S. preference was for a stable and reliable—and 
occasionally deportable—workforce for southwestern agricultural jobs. Thus, the 
first immigration inspectors on the Southwest border—seventy-five agents on 
horseback, commissioned in 1904—mainly guarded against illegal Chinese im-
migration. An independent Border Patrol was not established until the Immigra-
tion Act of 1924, again primarily for the purposes of controlling unwanted Asian 
and European entries (Meyers 2005). With agricultural interest groups and other 
pro-migration groups enjoying organizational advantages over labor unions and 
opponents of liberal migration flows, U.S. officials often have been more con-
cerned with ensuring access to needed labor than with preventing undocumented 
inflows (Freeman 1995; Tichenor 2002). These concerns became top priorities 
during World Wars I and II and the Korean War, when military planners warned 
that “food is as essential to victory as planes, tanks, ships, and guns” (U.S. Con-
gress 1951, 39).
The preference for access to cheap labor was balanced by episodic concerns 
about border security (again, especially during wartime), the harmful effects of 
immigration on U.S. workers, and equity for other countries of origin. These 
concerns contributed to termination of the Bracero Program in 1964 and passage 
of the Immigration and Nationality Act amendments of 1965 and 1976, placing 
Mexico on equal footing with other countries by restricting Mexicans to 20,000 
new permanent visas per year (plus an unlimited number of immediate-family-
member visas). 
These new restrictions on legal migration, along with boom–bust cycles in 
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rise in undocumented immigration beginning in the 1970s and persisting into the 
present period. Combined with the focus on border enforcement as part of the 
“war on drugs” beginning in 1969 and intensifying during the 1980s and the “war 
on terrorism” since 2001, sustained undocumented immigration has made gaining 
control of the border a top priority.2
If border security is a universally accepted priority, important divisions exist 
with respect to additional immigration policy goals at this time. On one hand, 
demographic changes within the United States (falling birthrates, rising education 
levels) mean that increased migration has also been associated with increased de-
pendence on immigrant labor.3 In a break with the past, many labor unions have 
embraced these flows, joining business groups to demand not reduced immigra-
tion, but rather a predictable and legal migrant workforce (Haus 2002). Pro-immi-
gration business and labor interests are strengthened by the general integration of 
the U.S. and Mexican economies—Mexico is now the United States’ second-larg-
est trade partner—as most policymakers and analysts agree that border enforce-
ment must not disrupt legal commerce. On the other hand, a significant minority 
questions the economic benefits of immigration and argues either for absolute 
reductions in inflows or, at a minimum, for de-emphasizing access to immigrant 
labor and focusing on tougher migration control.
Overall Bilateral Relations 
The  potential  for  translating  these  shifting  migration  preferences  into   
collaborative policy outcomes depends not just on the extent to which prefer-
ences overlap but also on the broader strategic context in which policymak-
ing occurs. Overall, the U.S.–Mexican relationship passed through roughly five 
phases during the twentieth century. The first decades were characterized by a 
high degree of conflict and mistrust, especially in the wake of 1914 and 1917 U.S. 
interventions in Mexico’s revolution and civil war. Relations remained strained 
during the 1930s when President Cárdenas nationalized U.S. oil holdings within 
Mexico, and Mexico responded to the subsequent U.S. boycott of Mexican oil 
sales by increasing its exports to Germany on the eve of World War II. The oil 
controversy was resolved on terms favorable to Mexico in the context of Franklin 
Roosevelt’s “Good Neighbor” policy toward Latin America, and Mexico joined the 
U.S. war effort.
The postwar period has been described as an era of “bargained negligence” 
(Domínguez and Fernández de Castro 2001). Under a tacit Cold War agreement, 
Mexican politicians distanced themselves from the Soviet Union and kept the 
Mexican Communist Party in check, and the United States turned a blind eye 
to Mexico’s occasionally authoritarian style of governance. This benign neglect 
was strained during the 1970s as Mexican Presidents Luís Echeverría (1970–76) 
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American rhetoric in positioning Mexico as a leader of the nonaligned nations 
movement. And relations deteriorated further during the 1980s as the two nations 
clashed over Mexico’s debt crisis, U.S. militarism in Central America and Mexico’s 
support for the Contadora peace process, fraudulent Mexican congressional elec-
tions in 1985, and conflict over the U.S. war on drugs (Chabat 1996). The bilateral 
relationship hit a low point when U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration Special 
Agent Enrique Camarena was kidnapped and killed in Mexico in 1985. U.S. Cus-
toms Service Director William von Raab testified before the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee the following year that high-ranking Mexican officials, including 
perhaps the family of Mexican President Miguel de la Madrid, directly participated 
in and profited from the drug trade.
Finally, the pendulum swung in the other direction beginning with the inau-
gurations of Mexican President Carlos Salinas in December 1988 and U.S. Presi-
dent George Bush in January 1989. The once-every-twelve-years double inaugu-
ration provided a chance for a fresh start, and the Bush administration recognized 
that rapprochement would improve the United States’ ability to address each of 
the still-festering problems of the 1980s (Fauriol 1989/90; Thorup 1989). The 
two presidents met three times in 1988–89, and in 1989 Mexico abandoned its 
two-century struggle to escape the U.S. economic orbit by initiating bilateral free 
trade negotiations, a process that culminated with passage of NAFTA in 1993. Like 
Salinas and Bush, Presidents Bill Clinton and Ernesto Zedillo continued to make 
personal investment in the bilateral relationship, and with the resolution of most 
1980s-era conflicts, the successful U.S.–Mexican trade deal seemed poised to 
be the cornerstone of the U.S. hemispheric integration agenda (Domínguez and 
Fernández de Castro 2001; Fishlow and Jones 1999).4
Bilateral Migration Relations 
The bilateral migration relationship has been shaped by these shifts in the 
broader strategic relationship but has also taken on a logic of its own, especially 
when U.S. vulnerability to Mexican emigration pressures overlaps with other eco-
nomic and security considerations, raising the stakes of a successful migration 
policy. Prior to World War II, conflicting preferences and strained overall rela-
tions caused both countries to pursue strictly unilateral migration policies. In the 
U.S. case, the free flow of Mexican workers was an unintended casualty of the 
U.S. effort to restrict Asian and European immigration at the turn of the century, 
including restrictions on the admission of contract workers and the imposition of 
a literacy requirement and head tax on immigrants. Policymakers recognized the 
importance of migrant labor for U.S. economic security and wartime prepared-
ness and suspended these new restrictions for Mexican migrants by establishing 
a new guest-worker visa during World War I (Reisler 1976).
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Mexican participation and which conflicted with Mexico’s postrevolution state-
building and economic development program. The federal government in Mexico 
City actively discouraged outflows at the distant northern border, but the effort 
met with little success (Fitzgerald 2006). Immigration relations took a turn for the 
worse during the Depression, when roughly one million Mexicans—along with 
an unknown number of U.S. citizens of Mexican descent—were rounded up and 
deported, while others were harassed into self-deportation or chose to leave in 
response to the poor U.S. labor market (Jungmeyer 1988). Mexican Labor and In-
terior Ministry officials organized their own repatriation programs to protect their 
citizens from harassment. Thus, by the end of the 1930s, migration had become 
an independent source of bilateral conflict, and traditional circular flows had 
largely ground to a halt.
In this context, U.S. economic growth beginning in 1939 and the passage of 
the Selective Service Act in 1940 raised acute concerns about agricultural labor 
shortages as the United States prepared to enter World War II. Growers petitioned 
for a World War I-style guest-worker program in which Mexicans would be admit-
ted on private contracts, but the Roosevelt administration—in the midst of the 
Cárdenas oil controversy—rejected these calls for diplomatic reasons. Then in 
1942, Roosevelt directed diplomats and agricultural officials to approach Mexico 
about a bilateral guest-worker deal in which Mexican state actors would be re-
sponsible for labor recruitment. In the context of strained relations and fears 
about a German foothold in Mexico, negotiators were instructed to defer to Mexi-
can concerns about the specifics of the deal (Gamboa 1990; U.S. Department of 
State 1943, 538–44). Under the resulting agreement, Mexican workers were guar-
anteed a minimum wage (unlike American agricultural workers) as well as trans-
portation expenses, housing benefits, and basic health care. Mexico insisted that 
contracts be signed by the U.S. government, with agricultural employers acting as 
subcontractors. And Mexico also blacklisted the entire state of Texas, which had 
a particularly bad record of immigrant labor relations. As Lessard (1984, 42–47) 
observes, the overall agreement most closely resembled the Mexican Federal 
Labor Law of 1931, passed specifically to respond to abuses of earlier Mexican 
emigrants.
U.S. officials and growers were divided about the program. Growers pressed 
for more flexibility and twice (in 1943 and 1948) prevailed upon local border of-
ficials to admit Mexican workers to Texas in violation of the treaty. But the White 
House and State Department remained committed to their bilateral approach, 
intervening in both cases to prevent additional admissions. The Roosevelt and 
Truman administrations also resisted grower demands to renegotiate the treaty 
and angered members of Congress by holding growers accountable to the terms 
of their Bracero contracts. Nonetheless, contract enforcement weakened after the 
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as were both eliminated over Mexico’s objections when Congress threatened to 
pass legislation authorizing a unilateral World War I-style program (Calavita 1992; 
Rosenblum 2003).
Two additional turning points were reached, in 1951 and 1954. First, with the 
United States entering the Korean War, Mexico threatened to obstruct emigration 
unless the United States agreed to resume state-to-state contracting. The White 
House agreed, but Congress rejected Truman and Mexico’s additional demand 
that employers be prevented from hiring undocumented immigrants outside the 
program. Caught between a pro-grower Congress and a pro-agreement Mexico, 
Truman was forced to accept Congress’ version of the bill, and the so-called Texas 
Proviso gave employers immunity from the new crime of “harboring or abetting” 
undocumented immigrants.
Second, with the signing of the Korean armistice in 1953 and the inauguration 
of the more pro-business Eisenhower administration in January 1954, the United 
States adopted a tougher bargaining position, insisting that Mexico contribute to 
migration control efforts by patrolling its side of the border and that guest-worker 
contract disputes be arbitrated by the United States rather than bilaterally. Nego-
tiations broke down, and Mexico played its only remaining card by placing troops 
on the border to prevent Bracero exits. The move backfired, however, when U.S. 
border agents assisted illegal (from Mexico’s perspective) crossers and gave them 
visas; and Mexico was forced to accept the U.S. terms or be excluded from any 
role in the program. Thus, if bilateral relations were generally characterized by 
benign neglect during the 1950s, immigration relations after 1954 came to be 
characterized by gross exploitation of Mexican immigrants during the mature 
phase of the Bracero Program (Rosenblum 2003).
Mexico’s  ability  to  manage  guest-worker  flows  remained  compromised 
thereafter, but bilateral relations still influenced the timing of the program’s de-
mise. Under pressure from the Democratically controlled Congress and from his   
domestic constituents to terminate the program, the pro-labor President Kennedy 
nonetheless agreed to Mexico’s request that the program be extended for two 
years in 1961 and one year in 1963. Kennedy had a long voting record against 
the program as a member of Congress but explained his support for the exten-
sion on the grounds that “I am aware … of the serious impact in Mexico if many 
thousands of workers employed in this country were summarily deprived of this 
much-needed employment” (American Reference Library 1999, 639 –40).
The possibility of a new bilateral guest-worker deal remained on the regional 
agenda for the next decade. Mexico petitioned the United States for a renewed 
guest-worker  program  throughout  the  1960s,  but  the  United  States  rejected   
the requests, and no formal talks were held. The 1973 oil shock reversed this dy-
namic, as the United States offered Mexico a new guest-worker deal in exchange 
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the nationalist Echeverría administration, emboldened by the promise of robust 
oil-fueled growth, rejected the offers (Fitzgerald 2006; Rico 1992). 
Migration relations deteriorated during the high-conflict 1980s. U.S. officials 
recognized that Mexico would bear the brunt of new enforcement measures con-
tained in the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), but no bilateral 
talks were held on the legislation, and Mexico rejected a formal invitation to par-
ticipate in U.S. Senate hearings leading up to IRCA’s passage. Partly for these rea-
sons, even though earlier legislation debated in 1983 and 1984 included language 
to expand legal Mexican visas to offset the new enforcement measures, these 
provisions were eliminated from the final version of the bill without discussion. 
Similarly, even when relations improved under Bush and Salinas, Mexican nego-
tiators made an explicit decision not to raise migration issues as part of a new 
trade deal during NAFTA talks, and NAFTA’s “labor chapter” regulates workplace 
rules but not labor flows.5
Immigration became a still greater source of conflict during the 1990s as 
California Governor Pete Wilson based his successful reelection campaign on the 
demonization of undocumented immigrants leading up to the passage of that 
state’s Proposition 187 to deny undocumented immigrants access to education 
and health care. Republican House members made tough immigration restric-
tions a priority following their victory in the landslide “Contract with America” 
election in 1994, and Republican presidential candidate Patrick Buchanan took a 
similar message on the national campaign trail. The trend culminated in 1996 with 
the passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
(IIRIRA), which restricted immigrants’ access to public services and strengthened 
migration enforcement. Meanwhile, the United States adopted a new policy of 
“prevention through deterrence” at the U.S.–Mexican border, dramatically ex-
panding enforcement personnel and equipment to discourage attempted entries. 
In practice, however, the partial militarization of the border produced no mea-
surable decline in attempted entries but led to a sharp increase in border-area 
violence and deaths as immigrants turned to professional smugglers and crossed 
the border in ever more remote areas (Cornelius 2001; Meyers 2005).
The contrast between steadily deteriorating immigration relations and im-
provements in other aspects of the bilateral relationship finally caused policy-
makers on both sides of the border to seek more collaborative solutions to the 
growing immigration crisis. The U.S.–Mexican Binational Commission, founded 
in 1977 by the Carter and López Portillo administrations but dormant during the 
1980s, led the way by elevating its immigration subgroup to full working group 
status in 1990 and then received sustained cabinet-level attention during the Clin-
ton presidency. The commission sponsored a major binational study of immigra-
tion, producing the first quasi-official consensus document on the causes of un-
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stocks and flows (Binational Study on Migration 1997). Agreements were signed 
in 1996 and 1997 creating four separate programs to establish joint procedures 
for U.S. Border Patrol agents and Mexican consuls during deportation proceed-
ings (Mechanisms of Consultation), standing links between municipal officials 
along the border (Border Liaison Mechanisms), and a program to target U.S. 
resources to migrant-sending communities—all Mexican priorities (Domínguez 
and Fernández de Castro 2001; Rosenblum 2004a; Sassen 1999). These border-
level institutions produced significant improvements in the protection of immi-
grant rights, and the Clinton administration also responded to Mexican pressure 
by demanding important changes to the IIRIRA to mitigate some of its most harm-
ful effects (Gimpel and Edwards 1999; Rosenblum 2004b).6 Thus, even though 
Mexicans scorned the IIRIRA and new U.S. border enforcement strategies for 
“criminalizing” undocumented immigrants, they praised the Clinton administra-
tion for its bilateral approach to the issue (Rosenblum 2004a).
Evaluating the Historical Record 
In sum, the United States and Mexico initiated a genuinely bilateral immigra-
tion regime for the first time in 1942, and both countries derived benefits from the 
Bracero Program during World War II. But this example is exceptional. In other 
cases, bilateral policymaking was limited by opposition from one or more policy 
actors in the United States or Mexico, as in 1951–53 when Congress agreed to 
Mexico’s demand that guest-worker contracting occur on a state-to-state level but 
blocked Truman’s effort to impose sanctions on noncooperative employers, and 
in the 1990s when congressional restrictionism ensured that Clinton’s outreach 
to Mexico on migration issues was limited to midlevel institutional changes and 
small modifications to the IIRIRA. Even fewer opportunities for collaboration exist 
when policymakers in either country uniformly oppose bilateral migration poli-
cymaking, as was the case in both countries prior to World War II, in the United 
States in 1954 and 1986, and in Mexico in the 1970s.
Why has successful collaboration been such an unusual policy outcome? On 
one hand, policymakers in both states confront domestic political obstacles. In 
Mexico, the revolutionary state’s founding mythology emphasizes economic na-
tionalism and independence from the United States; and U.S.–Mexican migration 
cooperation remains particularly controversial. In the United States, even though 
pro-immigration interest groups have often dominated the policymaking process 
(Freeman 1995; Joppke 1998), they have rarely viewed Mexico as an ally in this 
fight; and nativists and other opponents of generous immigration policies are 
even more hostile to a bilateral approach.
More  important,  collaboration  has  offered  limited  substantive  benefits  to   
either  country.  While  the  Roosevelt  and  Truman  administrations  enforced   
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of the Bracero Program, for most of its history the program is correctly recalled 
as nakedly exploitative of immigrant workers, offering few benefits to Mexico 
beyond the veneer of a formal state role in emigration. Mexico’s rejection of   
an oil-for-guest-workers deal in the 1970s was based on the correct assessment 
that its workers enjoyed access to U.S. labor markets with or without a visa, 
and on skepticism that legal access would bring additional concrete protections. 
Similarly, with the exception of the initial Bracero period when bilateral recruit-
ment helped jump-start stalled labor flows, bilateralism has offered few tangible 
benefits to the United States. Once Mexico tried and failed to prevent outflows in 
1954, the U.S. preference for access to labor was reliably satisfied via unilateral 
recruitment policies. Thus, migration cooperation has been undermined because 
unilateral migration policies have done an adequate job of protecting core migra-
tion interests without taking on the additional costs associated with a bilateral 
regime.
For these reasons, the best predictor of migration cooperation has not been 
variance in the underlying structure of the migration problem but rather in the 
broader  bilateral,  regional,  and  global  context.  U.S.  military  vulnerability  in   
1942  and  1951  substantially  enhanced  Mexican  bargaining  power  not  only   
because  it  increased  the  value  of  U.S.  access  to  Mexican  labor  but  also  be-
cause U.S. planners saw linkages between a migration deal and their additional   
goals of a stable regional relationship and a damper on Mexico’s flourishing   
relationship with Germany prior to World War II. Then when the anti-Bracero   
Kennedy administration confronted a Democratic Congress inclined to termi-
nate the program, it was the administration’s Latin American agenda that caused 
the president to intervene in favor of gradually phasing out the program, as 
Craig (1971, 189) explains: “To abolish Mexico’s third-most-important source of 
foreign exchange on short notice would have been too much out of character   
with Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress.” Even during the 1990s, Clinton admin-
istration officials de-emphasized the migration-specific benefits of border-level 
institutions and argued that the administration sought to balance congressional 
hard-liners primarily to protect the fragile U.S.–Mexican relationship (Rosenblum 
2004b, 88).
Conversely, strained relations have undermined opportunities for migration 
cooperation. Not only did Mexico perceive an immigration deal as unnecessary 
by the mid-1970s, but making such a deal would have been particularly difficult 
for the Echeverría and López Portillo administrations, which staked their domestic 
legitimacy on their independence from the United States. And during the 1980s, 
even though members of Congress sought Mexican input during the IRCA debate, 
the broader downturn in the bilateral relationship made it impossible for Mexico 
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Contemporary Opportunities and Obstacles to a Bilateral  
Migration Regime
The end of the Cold War and the 9/11 attacks may mark the beginning of a 
new era in U.S.–Mexican relations, and recent developments within the United 
States and Mexico signal the possible emergence of a new politics of migration 
within each country as well. While it is too early to reach conclusions about how 
these changes will affect bilateral migration relations, the following sections offer 
some tentative judgments about the potential for these changes to usher in a new 
era of cooperation and about remaining obstacles to bilateralism.
Opportunities for Collaboration
Have changes in the international context improved the prospects for a new 
bilateral migration regime? On their surface, the 9/11 attacks would seem to place 
a premium on collaborative enforcement efforts. Indeed, if Mexico was perceived 
as an indispensable ally during World War II and the Korean War by virtue of its 
ability to provide essential workers, it is similarly in the position today—when six 
out of ten new jobs are filled by immigrant workers (Sum et al. 2005)—to play a 
critical role in sustaining healthy U.S. economic growth. Moreover, with 80 per-
cent of undocumented immigrants to the United States coming from Mexico and 
the Caribbean Basin, and with 12,500 trucks and 660,000 people legally crossing 
the U.S.–Mexican border each day, Mexico is uniquely positioned to contribute to 
U.S. counterterrorism efforts.8
In addition, Mexico remains a gateway for U.S. interests throughout Latin 
America. As in the 1990s, hemispheric economic integration remains a high pri-
ority for many U.S. policymakers of both parties. Any immigration deal could 
substantially strengthen U.S.–Mexican economic institutions and political ties and 
would likely deepen Mexico’s commitment to pro-market economic policies fa-
vored by the United States but increasingly controversial in Mexico and through-
out Latin America.9
Second, domestic political changes in each country also seem to reveal new 
opportunities for a collaborative approach. In the Mexican case, an immigration 
deal would be the next logical step in the process of integrating the transna-
tional community within Mexican political life. This process began in earnest in 
1990 when the Mexican Foreign Ministry established its Program for Mexican 
Communities Abroad (reorganized in 2001 as the Institute for Mexicans Abroad), 
which promotes linkages between Mexicans in the United States and public and 
private institutions within Mexico, seeks to improve the image and self-image 
of Mexicans within the United States, promotes social and political organizing 
within Mexican-American communities, and strengthens the role of the Mexican 
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1999; González Gutiérrez 1999). Mexican legislation in 1996 to permit “dual na-
tionality,” in 1998 to permit dual citizenship, and in 2002 to permit voting abroad 
reinforced this agenda, as did Fox’s widely embraced pledge to “govern for 120 
million Mexicans” (that is, 100 million in Mexico and 20 million in the United 
States).
There are also reasons to believe that political space for a bilateral migration 
deal may exist within the United States. Public opinion polls during 2006 regis-
tered greater interest in immigration reform than at any point in the previous two 
decades, and demand for reform was arguably higher than at any point since 
the 1920s. Most Americans believe that the U.S. economy depends on immigrant 
labor; and numerous polls conducted in the spring and summer of 2006 and in 
the spring of 2007 found that between 60 and 80 percent of respondents favored 
immigration reforms that included a new, large temporary-worker program. Labor 
groups that actively opposed new inflows during the 1970s and ’80s (for example, 
the AFL-CIO) are now more focused on regularizing flows, and labor support 
for an immigration deal would be particularly strong if it also strengthened U.S. 
unions’ ability to organize Mexican workers. Employers who previously dismissed 
the possibility of effective migration enforcement now confront labor shortages 
and would welcome a system that guarantees access to workers even at the cost 
of new labor rights. These labor and business concerns were at the heart of the 
left–right coalition supporting the Senate’s Comprehensive Immigration Reform 
Act during the 2005–06 and 2007–08 sessions of Congress. Finally, top strategists 
in both parties see a long-term benefit to building support among Latino voters, 
who generally favor reform packages that include legalization and expanded le-
gal migration and who likewise presumably would support a bilateral deal. 
These contextual changes make it easy to describe the contents of a bilateral 
migration deal that could achieve widespread support in both countries. The first 
pillar of a new regime would be enhanced security on and around the U.S.–Mexi-
can border and greater collaboration on regional security issues in general. For 
years, Mexico perceived border insecurity as a U.S. problem: border crime con-
tributed to the flow of drugs and people into the United States but had few nega-
tive consequences for Mexicans per se. But border violence has begun to spread 
deeper into the Mexican interior, and in a democratic Mexico with an active, 
independent media, the failure to curtail border violence has become a liability 
for incumbents. For this reason, Mexican law enforcement agencies have already 
substantially expanded their efforts to prevent undocumented transmigration and 
to assist U.S. counternarcotics efforts.10
Existing Mexican enforcement efforts potentially represent the tip of the ice-
berg, and a bilateral agreement could substantially improve U.S. migration control 
if it expands existing interior repatriation programs (that is, deporting Mexican 
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plays a more active role in discouraging undocumented emigration by its citizens, 
and if Mexico increases enforcement against transmigration. Mexican assistance 
on other security priorities could be even more significant, including enhanced 
connectivity of U.S. and Mexican counterterrorism databases, greater U.S. access 
to Mexican immigration data, a direct U.S. enforcement role at Mexican ports 
of entry, and a direct enforcement role for U.S. counternarcotics agents on the 
Mexican side of the border. Mexico has rejected many of these ideas in the past, 
but current and former Mexican officials have signaled their willingness in recent 
years to place some of these long-desired (by the United States) concessions on 
the negotiating table as part of a comprehensive deal.11
The second pillar of a bilateral migration deal would be enhanced Mexican 
opportunities for legal migration and protection of Mexican immigrants’ rights 
within the United States. Previous Mexican criticism of emigrants’ loyalty to Mex-
ico has given way to an embrace of the vital role of migrant remittances, which 
totaled $24.5 billion in 2006. Thus, Mexican politicians have spoken out in sup-
port of a new U.S. temporary-worker program even without the promise of privi-
leged access for Mexicans. Yet there is an inherent tension between promoting 
temporary migration—that is, formally establishing a two-tier labor regime—and 
protecting workers’ rights. Thus, to satisfy liberal and pro-labor allies within the 
United States, a temporary-worker program must also include significant new 
protections to guard against migrant exploitation.
Despite the Bracero Program’s many flaws, the early years of the program 
offer important lessons about the value of bilateral enforcement. Indeed, Mexi-
can oversight of guest-worker contracts between 1942 and 1947—during which 
time consular workers had the power to suspend contracts and blacklist abusive 
employers—contributed to a high level of contract compliance, which is why 
employer allies in Congress made elimination of Mexico’s oversight role a top 
priority in 1947–48 and again in 1954 after state-to-state contracting resumed 
during the Korean War (Rosenblum 2003). Mexico’s existing consular network 
and Institute for Mexicans Abroad are a natural resource for ensuring immigrant 
workers’ rights; and Mexico would have great incentives in the context of a bilat-
eral agreement to absorb some of the enforcement costs associated with contract 
oversight. In addition, Mexican labor officials could take responsibility for migrant 
screening and recruitment within Mexico, preventing exploitation by private labor 
contractors who would otherwise play such a role.
Finally, the third pillar of a new bilateral immigration deal could be restoring 
circular migration patterns and promoting development in Mexican communities 
of origin as a strategy for reducing long-term push factors. Mexican programs 
like Tres-por-Uno (three-to-one), which provides federal, state, and local match-
ing funds to supplement migrant remittances targeting community development 
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such a program. Nongovernmental immigrant hometown associations have also 
funded development within sending communities, and a new immigration deal 
might emphasize public–private partnerships based on this model. Many U.S. 
actors recognize the logic of this approach, which has long been seen as the 
primary tool available to reduce emigration pressures (Commission for the Study 
of International Migration and Cooperative Economic Development 1990). Efforts 
to target remittances to local development projects could be combined with pro-
grams to encourage return migration by temporary workers, a priority for some 
supporters of comprehensive immigration reform in the United States and a trend 
that would ultimately strengthen bilateral relations. Under a bilateral regime, re-
turn flows would be encouraged through market-based incentives, such as return 
bonds, withheld wages, or a binational pension program, rather than through an 
enforcement-only approach.
Obstacles to Collaboration
Each of the contextual changes discussed above cuts both ways, raising ob-
stacles to those who favor a bilateral approach, and specific proposals for bilater-
alism raise additional questions.
First, in terms of the broader international context, post-9/11 concerns about 
security make Mexico a more valuable ally, but they also raise new concerns 
about the “special peril of defection,” raising barriers to cooperation for the rea-
sons the traditional international relations literature predicts. That is, while U.S. 
security experts embrace a regional approach, they also worry that Mexican en-
forcement agents may be less committed to protecting U.S. security, less pre-
pared, or more prone to corruption. And the evidence so far is not that the United 
States has reached out to Mexico as a valuable ally in the war on terror, as during 
World War II, but that the two nations have reentered a Cold War-style era of be-
nign neglect.12 An immigration deal would also have ambiguous implications for 
U.S. hemispheric integration goals, as any deepening of U.S.–Mexican economic 
integration immediately raises questions about “parity” for other Caribbean Basin 
and Western Hemisphere states: Why should Mexico receive privileged access to 
U.S. markets while CAFTA-DR countries are excluded, for example?13
Second, clear political obstacles to reform also remain in place in each coun-
try. Fox placed such a deal at the center of his presidency in 2001 and suf-
fered the consequences throughout the remainder of his term from the definitive 
American withdrawal from bilateral negotiations. In a March 2006 poll, only 52 
percent of Mexicans considered good relations with the United States important 
to Mexico’s future (Zogby International 2006). The same poll found that a plural-
ity of Mexicans (32 percent) believed they had been personally harmed by the 
NAFTA treaty and that a majority (53 percent) opposed the idea of linking tighter 
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be the focus of an immigration agreement as described here.
On the U.S. side, opposition to a bilateral migration deal would come from 
the same actors who supported unilateral enforcement-only measures rather than 
comprehensive reform during the 109th and 110th Congresses. Indeed, House 
Republicans hardened their opposition to a temporary-worker program, legaliza-
tion, and other benefits in the wake of the Senate’s passage of the Comprehensive 
Immigration Reform Act of 2006. And large-scale marches and rallies in support 
of comprehensive immigration reform in the spring gave way to a backlash by 
anti-immigration single-issue groups, which brought significant grassroots pres-
sure to bear on Republicans and Democrats alike throughout the summer of 2006 
and lasting into the following year.
Finally, the details of the three-pillar structure would also raise a number 
of questions. First, working out a Mexico-specific temporary-worker program 
would be difficult, raising questions about the timing of new admissions relative 
to enhanced enforcement efforts, whether temporary workers should have the 
opportunity eventually to become U.S. citizens, and how to handle temporary 
workers’ health and pension benefits, among other issues. Second, how would 
the agreement balance migrants’ rights within the United States against the goal 
of stronger migration enforcement? Bilateral negotiations would have to resolve 
disputes over specific enforcement measures under consideration in the United 
States, including limits on migrants’ access to the court system, expanded use of 
mandatory detention and expedited deportation, and the proposal to redefine 
undocumented status as a felony or misdemeanor criminal offense. The most 
fundamental questions regard the rights of undocumented immigrants within the 
United States: While a majority (often as many as three-quarters) of Americans 
polled in 2006 and 2007 favored proposals to allow undocumented immigrants 
who meet a range of requirements to earn legal status, a significant minority pas-
sionately opposes “amnesty” under any circumstances. Mexico would likely insist 
that a bilateral deal include realistic paths to legality for these Mexican citizens 
(Hernández et al. 2005). 
Conclusion: Prospects for Reform
In sum, despite the uncertainty about the future of immigration reform within 
the United States, this review confirms that ample areas of agreement exist around 
which a bilateral agreement could, in principle, be negotiated. A bilateral approach 
enjoys especially widespread support among Mexican elites, and Mexico’s appar-
ent willingness to offer substantial new support to U.S. law enforcement efforts 
in exchange for privileged access to U.S. labor markets could be at the heart of a 
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But a well-crafted bilateral deal based on expanded legal access for Mexican 
workers and protection of immigrant rights, joint enforcement to prevent undocu-
mented migration and enhance U.S. security, and promotion of circular flows and 
Mexican regional development projects could achieve widespread support from 
the same left–right coalition of grassroots and elite groups and policymakers that 
supported comprehensive reform proposals in the Senate in 2006 and 2007 and 
the president’s proposed migration reform in 2005. Moreover, there is little doubt 
that an agreement based around these three pillars could be of substantial mutual 
benefit to the United States and Mexico. Thus, whereas a bilateral immigration 
regime failed to generate serious discussion in the post-Bracero period because 
no basic consensus existed on areas of mutual concern, today’s higher priorities 
on regional security and economic integration have changed these dynamics so 
that bilateralism offers the possibility of concrete benefits.
What is the likelihood that bilateral talks will resume and usher in major 
changes? In the short term, the political costs and benefits of a bilateral deal may 
turn on the election results of 2006 and 2008. House Republicans moved hard to 
the right on immigration reform during the summer of 2006, seeking to use migra-
tion as a wedge issue to mobilize conservative voters; but this strategy was unsuc-
cessful at best, and may have backfired in many cases. Overall, exit polls found 
that a solid majority of midterm voters (57 percent versus 38 percent) wanted 
immigration reform to provide undocumented immigrants working in the United 
States a chance to apply for legal status rather than face deportation (Kondracke 
2006). And while immigration was not at the center of most midterm races, pro-
comprehensive reform candidates defeated hard-liners in thirteen of sixteen races 
in which the immigration debate was prominently featured.14 Perhaps most im-
portant, Hispanic voters turned out in large numbers and voted overwhelmingly 
for Democrats, reversing gains made by the Bush administration during the 2004 
presidential race and jeopardizing the president’s highly touted plans for Hispan-
ics to become a core constituency for Republicans in the future.15 Even though 
the Democratically controlled Congress failed to produce immigration legislation 
in 2007—and many of the newly elected Democrats were lukewarm support-
ers of reform, at best—the early position-taking for the 2008 race suggests that 
comprehensive reform will remain an increasingly partisan issue, at least at the 
presidential level, with Democrats favoring a policy package that could lend itself 
to bilateralism and Republicans (with the exception of John McCain) coming out 
strongly for an enforcement-only approach.
As with any bilateral initiative—or any major immigration reform—a second 
key question concerns presidential leadership. Will President Bush find an oppor-
tunity to return to immigration reform during his final year in office? It would re-
quire strong presidential leadership in both countries to craft a multidimensional 
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port for a bilateral deal, Bush failed to keep immigration on the bilateral agenda, 
and his support for the Senate’s comprehensive reform bill during 2006 was also 
less consistent than supporters had hoped. The president—along with Secre-
tary of Commerce Carlos Gutierrez and Secretary of Homeland Security Michael 
Chertoff—was far more engaged during the 2007 Senate debate, but Republican 
opponents of the Senate bill and process ignored the administration’s appeals 
for support. Following three years of congressional false starts, the inauguration 
of a pro-reform president in 2009 may see a bilateral approach, working with a 
like-minded Felipe Calderón, as an opportunity to jump-start the U.S. immigration 
debate just as Bush initially intended in 2001. 
This raises a third question about the institutional venue for a bilateral deal. 
Many initiatives to enhance collaborative enforcement, streamline legal flows, 
and invest in Mexican communities of origin have already begun through the 
U.S.–Mexican–Canadian Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America 
(SPP). Important examples include voluntary interior repatriation agreements, the 
joint countersmuggling program OASISS, the SENTRI program to allow pre-ap-
proved entry for “trusted travelers” who undergo background checks and obtain 
radio frequency ID cards, and the bilateral Border Security Initiative in which 
U.S. Border Patrol and Mexican Grupo Beta agents work and train together. Their 
shared mission is reducing illegal entries while preventing border deaths and im-
proving humanitarian conditions along the border. Further collaboration through 
the SPP would not require extensive public debate or cooperation from Congress, 
but the SPP does not offer the possibility of substantial additional Mexican ac-
cess to U.S. labor markets, nor do the executive agreements and memoranda of 
understanding upon which the SPP is based offer an opportunity to use an im-
migration deal as a high-profile tool of hemispheric diplomacy. As in the 1990s, 
bilateral progress through modest executive branch institutional reforms is thus 
easier to contemplate than major legislative or treaty-based changes but offers 
more limited benefits.
Any prospects for a new bilateral migration agreement require continued po-
litical and economic stability in Mexico. Mistrust of Mexican enforcement capacity 
and integrity is a key obstacle to good-faith bargaining on the part of many U.S. 
policymakers, and the new security context raises the stakes associated with an 
unreliable negotiating partner. The protest tactics employed by Andrés Manuel 
López Obrador and his supporters following Mexico’s disputed 2006 election rep-
resented a strong disincentive to risk-averse U.S. policymakers who might have 
considered investments in a more formal bilateral immigration regime, though by 
the middle of 2007, the Calderón administration had demonstrated an impressive 
ability to restore order to the Mexican capital and engender broader-than-expect-
ed support within the Mexican Congress. Even in the absence of additional con-
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development and the breadth of support for López Obrador’s radical critique of 
U.S.-backed economic policies highlight the potential gains from a new bilateral 
migration agreement—but also the barriers to negotiating one.
Finally, in the long run, the successful implementation of a bilateral migration 
deal will depend to a great extent on the ability of Mexican politicians and the 
U.S.–Mexican transnational community to complete the project of redefining the 
issue in those terms. Migration differs from the cross-border movement of goods 
and capital because the movement of people represents more than a simple shift 
in factors of production. But at the same time, a globalization regime that liberal-
izes only some types of flows is fundamentally asymmetric, penalizing owners of 
labor relative to other participants in the global economy. The United States and 
Mexico confront deeper challenges in resolving this tension than in the cases, say, 
of the European Union or Mercosur states, but the challenge will only intensify 
as the U.S. and Mexican economies otherwise continue their broader integration. 
In this sense, how the United States and Mexico define their bilateral migration 
problem may be an important predictor of how the United States defines its fu-
ture relationship with the global economy.
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1  As a former Mexican executive branch official involved in the effort to develop a more aggres-
sive migration policy explained, “It does not count as intervention in another country’s affairs 
when you are doing it to protect the rights of your own citizens” (Rosenblum 2004a, 108).
2  The focus on counterterrorism at U.S. borders began during the 1990s in the wake of the 1993 
World Trade Center bombing and the 1999 millennium bomber, intercepted at the U.S.–Cana-
dian border (Meyers 2005).
3  Immigrants combined to account for 15 percent of the U.S. workforce in 2004 and over 50 per-
cent of labor force growth since 1994 (Sum et al. 2005; Aspen Institute 2005).
4  Conflict over the Central American civil wars was resolved by the El Salvador peace treaty (1989) 
and Nicaraguan election (1990); conflict over Mexican democratization was resolved by free 
and fair elections in Mexico during the 1990s; conflict over Mexico’s debt crisis was resolved by 
Mexico’s commitment to “Washington Consensus” economic policies and the NAFTA deal; and 
conflict over narcotics was ameliorated by President Clinton’s consistent support for Mexico on 
this issue, including his use of the veto threat to block a congressional proposal to “decertify” 
Mexico as an ally in the war on drugs (Rosenblum 2004a).
5  Ironically, the only way immigration entered the NAFTA debate was when NAFTA’s supporters 
held out the promise of reduced Mexican emigration pressures as a reason for Americans to 
support the deal. Thus far the record suggests that NAFTA has had the opposite effect (Massey, 
Durand, and Malone 2002).
6  Clinton  threatened  a  veto  to  eliminate  the  Gallegly  amendment,  which  would  have  denied 
free  public  education  to  the  children  of  undocumented  immigrants;  and  the  administration 113  U.S.–Mexican Migration Cooperation: Obstacles and Opportunities
also scaled back congressional limits on poor families’ ability to sponsor family members for 
immigrant visas (the “deeming” requirement) and eased restrictions on immigrants’ access to 
welfare.
7  Senate Judiciary Chairman Alan Simpson (R-WY) traveled to Mexico and discussed migration 
legislation with officials there during the summer of 1986. Simpson supported efforts by the 
Foreign Relations Committee to invite Mexican officials to discuss migration issues at a June 
hearing on the “Situation in Mexico,” but Mexicans boycotted the hearing in the wake of the 
inflammatory William von Raab testimony before the same committee just one month earlier.
8  The border is not the weakest link in U.S. counterterrorism efforts; yet Mexico is still uniquely 
positioned to enhance U.S. security by assisting in the creation of a North American security 
perimeter, by screening cargo before it reaches the U.S. border, and by assisting in tracking 
terrorist mobility (Council on Foreign Relations 2005; Ginsburg 2006). Also see Flynn (2004).
9  While  U.S.–Mexican  migration  relations  were  not  prominently  featured  in  Mexico’s  2006 
presidential election, NAFTA, Mexico’s position in the global economy, and structural reform 
of the Mexican economy were among the most significant issues distinguishing the top two 
candidates, Felipe Calderón and Andrés Manuel López Obrador. In Mexico and throughout 
Latin America, U.S. unilateralism on migration issues, especially the “muro de muerte” (wall of 
death) at the U.S.–Mexican border, has become an inflammatory example of U.S. hypocrisy 
(for example, British Broadcasting Corporation 2006; Cormier 2006). Few developments would 
silence these critics more effectively than a formal U.S.–Mexican (or U.S.–regional) migration 
agreement.
10 According to the Mexican Embassy, Mexico arrested 57,000 individuals on drug trafficking 
crimes  between  2000  and  2005;  Mexico  currently  employs  38,000  civilian  and  military  law 
enforcement personnel in its counternarcotics efforts; and Mexico detained 216,000 transmi-
grants in 2004 and 206,000 in the first ten months of 2005. New bilateral initiatives have also 
been launched, including the 2002 Border Partnership Accord, which provides U.S. screening 
technology to Mexican inspectors and coordinates shared data on airline passenger manifests; 
and the Security and Prosperity Partnership, which seeks to streamline legal border crossing 
within the NAFTA area by implementing common data and documentation procedures.
11 For example, Mexican members of Congress unanimously agreed that “if a guest country offers 
a sufficient number of appropriate visas to cover the biggest possible number of workers and 
their families, which until now cross the border without documents because of the impossibility 
of obtaining them, Mexico should be responsible for guaranteeing that each person that decides 
to leave its territory does so following legal channels” (Hernández et al. 2005; emphasis added), 
a radical break with Mexico’s previous position against the regulation of outflows. The same joint 
resolution suggests that in the case of a comprehensive immigration deal, “Mexico would be in a 
better position to exhort potential migrants to abide by the proper rules and to adopt measures 
in order to reduce undocumented migration.” Also see Council on Foreign Relations (2005).
12 As Castañeda (2003, 68) concludes, “the region, at least in terms of U.S. attention, has become 
once again an Atlantis, a lost continent.”
13 Still, these deepening-versus-broadening conflicts are not insurmountable, as there are ample 
historical and contemporary reasons to limit a migration deal to Mexico; and (as the CAFTA-DR 
example implies), a deal with Mexico could likewise be expanded to encompass other countries 
of origin in the future.
14 Pro-immigration or pro-comprehensive reform candidates were victorious in House races in 
Arizona’s Eighth District (defeating Randy Graf, founder of the anti-immigrant Minutemen group), 11  Marc R. Rosenblum
Indiana’s Eighth District (defeating House Immigration Subcommittee Chairman John Hostet-
tler), Colorado’s Seventh, and Arizona’s Fifth (defeating prominent immigration hard-liner J. D. 
Hayworth); in Senate races in Florida, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Washington; and in guber-
natorial races in Arizona, California, Colorado, Kansas, and Wisconsin. Restrictionist Republican 
Senator Jon Kyl retained his seat in Arizona; and hard-liners won close races against pro-com-
prehensive-reform candidates in Pennsylvania’s Sixth District and Florida’s Thirteenth.
15 Eight percent of all voters in 2006 were Hispanic, the highest level ever recorded, and Hispanic 
voters reversed a recent trend by supporting Democrats over Republicans by a margin of 69 
percent to 29 percent, up from 65–35 in 2000, 62–38 in 2002, and 56–44 in 2004.
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